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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Problem Area 
The focus of this project will be the structure of the euro area, as we argue the structure of the euro 
area impacted the current financial crisis in Europe. The project will make use of Greece as a case 
study of the structural issues with regards to the euro area. 
After the Second World War, the groundwork of the European Union was put in place, and Europe, 
which just had been at war with each other, was now starting to unite. In 1951 the beginning of 
what we later would go on to know as the European Union was built in the form of the European 
Coal and Steel Community. Europe became more united, which eventually led to the Maastricht 
Treaty being signed in 1992 with the members of the European Union agreeing to the potential 
implementation of a common currency, the Euro. The thought behind this was to bring the countries 
closer together essentially reaching interdependency, so the damages of declaring war with a fellow 
European country would outweigh the benefits and ultimately escape a third war (Pryce 1994: 3). 
Prior to the crisis everything seemed to go as planned. Greece was experiencing growth, they had 
been allowed into the euro area in 2001, and the Olympics in 2004 had even benefitted the 
economy, even the investors believed in the Greek project (Bastasin 2012: 124). In 2009, the 
financial crisis hit Greece and the rest of Europe, which was caused by structural deficits. The 
Maastricht Treaty purpose was among other things to limit the deficit spending by the member 
countries, but countries had been able to mask their financial status (Brown & Chambers 2005). 
Then when the Greek government revealed their sovereign debt, questions were raised concerning 
the euro area and their supervision with member’s economy (Busch 2012). The European Union 
had not anticipated the crisis and was caught off guard resulting late actions against the crisis. The 
following reforms and attempts to dampen the crisis did not put forward the expected results (Lane 
2012). 
This project aims to investigate the impact of the Euro had on the financial crisis in Greece, and to 
what extent did it escalate the current crisis. The Western World has suffered from a financial crisis 
since 2007, where especially the Southern countries in Europe were severely hurt in the process. 
The crisis has led to severe unemployment and, in general, a humanitarian crisis. 
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We therefore want to look at how the Greek crisis has come so far in a monetary union where each 
member nation is bound by interdependency and should, arguably, strive for helping one another for 
a more beneficial monetary policy and economic equality. We want investigate the conditions, 
which made it possible for the Greek to accumulate such a massive debt, and how the Euro as a 
currency contributed towards that end. In general, we use have an interdisciplinary approach to this 
issue, and as the events are still unfolding we will have to analysis within a limited timeframe. The 
timeframe enables us better answer our research question. 
We argue that the structure of the European Union has been wrong from the beginning, and the 
economic prioritizing has been wrong. The whole idea behind a euro area has to be focused on the 
economic policies, and not primarily the political aspect, and furthermore, as we argue, a common 
fiscal policy should have been implemented from the beginning. The way the European 
Commission has been dealing with monetary issues has been limited, as there is a need for equal 
fiscal policies for the monetary policies to have big effect. We argue that the whole purpose of 
implementing a common currency was political and to convince as many countries to be a part of 
the euro area, resulted in neglect of the entry requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and bad 
economic behavior after the accession. This led to a weakened currency and insufficient supervision 
of member countries’ economy. 
This have led to the following research question: 
 
Research Question 
 
“How did the structure of the euro area impact Greece’s sovereign debt crisis?” 
 
Moreover, to help answering the research question following working questions has been chosen: 
 How did the implementation of the euro area and the Maastricht Treaty affect Greece? 
 How did the structure of the euro area impact the Greek economic development? 
 How did the constraints of the euro area affect Greece ability to handle the crisis? 
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Delimitation of Field of Research 
Timespan 
The field of research is currently in an ever developing state, largely due to the ongoing 
negotiations between the Greek government and the ‘Troika’ (IMF, European Commission and the 
European Central Bank) and the lack of political stability internally in Greece. To not venture into 
uncharted grounds, this project will have a limited timespan from around the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to a vaguely defined end 2012. The purpose of the limited timespan is not 
to exclude anything from an earlier or later date, insofar as it is relevant for the analysis, but rather 
to avoid two things. 
First and foremost, it is to avoid delving into history that does not necessarily have sufficient 
explanatory power over the Greek crisis, which is mainly history from before the Maastricht Treaty. 
Secondly, analysis of recent events is limited due to the time lag between an occurrence of an event 
and the following academic coverage, resulting in a sparse academic literature on the later part of 
the Greek crisis. Hence, when discussing events later than 2012, it will primarily be as a part of a 
theoretical argument. 
 
Legal Framework of the Euro Area 
The legal framework of the euro area is a vast research area, and despite its interesting insight into 
the Greek sovereign debt crisis, it is, however, outside the scope of this project. Analyzing the 
Maastricht Treaty and its amendments is a project in and of itself and would, therefore, relocate 
focus from other parts of the project’s analysis. It is our opinion that insight gain in the research 
area through a document analysis of the Maastricht Treaty and its amendments is not enough to 
justify allocating focus to such an analysis. It is, however, not the case that the project does not 
include small quantities of such an analysis, but it is, nevertheless, a minor part of the overall 
analysis of the structural failures of the euro area. 
 
National Politics of Greece 
The theoretical framework of the project assumes that the actors of the research area acts rationally 
within the predetermined structures, which means that little attention is given to the differences 
between the different incumbents of Greece. This does, however, leave out some valuable nuances 
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on the Greek handling of the crisis, but it does, however also, enabled the project to focus on a 
structural level analysis. It is, however, justified to assume that the Greek incumbents act in 
accordance with a rational choice theory as shown in chapter 5. 
 
Placing the Blame 
It is not the objective of this project to place the blame of the Greek crisis upon any actor as it is 
beyond the scope of the project. Had the objective of the project been to conclude upon who is to 
blame for the crisis, then the research area would have had to be expanded to include all actors of 
the crisis, resulting in a vastly different project. Such a project would also require a normative 
judgment upon the different actors impact upon the crisis. In this project we, however, strive to 
refrain from normatively judge the analyzed actors, as most actions are perceived to be a product of 
the prevailing structure of either the euro area or the Greek political milieu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hartvigsen, Søren Buster Nøhr – 55005  Group 14 
Haugaard, Mathias Erecius – 54998  The Euro and the Greek Crisis 
Page 9 of 67 
 
Chapter 2 – Methods 
Choice of Methods 
This project will make the choice of dealing with both qualitative and quantitative methods. The 
choice of methods will make for a broader and wider project, which will allow for a more detailed 
and stronger analysis, as the weaknesses of quantitative will be replaced by the benefits from 
qualitative methods and vice versa. 
We primarily use secondary sources, as it allows the project to continue with work already made 
within its research area by its most prominent scholars. The relevance of qualitative is apparent 
when we have to look at key actors in our field and their statements in regards to the issue we are 
dealing with. Quantitative methods are very important for our project, as we are dealing with 
economics, which is inherently measured numerically. Statistics will therefore heavily influence the 
project. We have chosen both methods, as we cannot see this project conducted without either one 
of them. 
There is a great variation of approaches in qualitative methods seen in the different interpretive and 
critical perspectives (Leavy & Hesse-Biber 2011: 16). Qualitative methods allow the project to go 
into detail with the key actors. It will enable us to look at the leaders of the euro area and analyze 
their actions. Another qualitative approach, which will be implemented in this project, is the case 
study. As this project focuses mainly on Greece in the specific context of the Euro, it is regarded as 
a case study. The case study allows for an in-depth analysis of one specific topic and through that 
analysis possible conclude on a general trend, in this case on the possible structural weaknesses of 
the Euro (Leavy & Hesse-Biber 2011: 255). The case study is a mixture of an intrinsic and an 
instrumental case study, as we want to understand the situation in Greece but also the larger issue 
regarding the common currency of the euro area (Leavy & Hesse-Biber 2011: 255). The 
weaknesses of qualitative methods in this project are that it cannot analyze the actions behind the 
key actor’s words and as such will not allow for a numerical approach. This is because the 
qualitative methods focus on the social context and behavior patterns instead of statistics, which is 
vital for our research. Qualitative can also become subjective, and one-sided. One could argue that 
the validity of the different politicians can be subject to discussion as they have a reputation to 
protect. 
The strengths of quantitative methods are that it expressed absolute terms, e.g. numerical, which 
makes it easy to analyze and compare with each other. It enables the project to be more objective, 
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which makes it easier to generalize, as there often are very few variables. Furthermore, it enables us 
to compare over time and a vast collection of sources. 
The weaknesses of quantitative methods are that the collected data set can be seen as superficial if it 
is not placed in a context and can, therefore, be missing human interpretation. The benefits of a 
mixed methods research approach are that it allows the methods to complement one another for a 
more comprehensive analysis (Leavy & Hesse-Biber 2011: 278). 
 
Research Approach 
In our project, we are using mixed methods research approach, which means that we combine 
qualitative and quantitative methods to account for the shortcomings of each method (Leavy & 
Hesse-Biber 2011: 278). It furthermore, enables our project to utilize the abundance of statistical 
data provided by the different statistical database, while still calculating for the weaknesses of 
quantitative methods. 
We aim to answer our research question with a deductive research strategy, as our project starting 
point is Keynesian theory of economics, which means that we through Keynesian theory can 
analyze the structural weaknesses throughout the euro area. Through the empirical data at hand, we 
will display trends within the economy of Greece that underpins our analysis (Park 2007, Leavy & 
Hesse-Biber 2011: 9). 
As our project is a mix between an intrinsic case study and instrumental case study, we aim to draw 
conclusions about the effect of the euro area on the Greek crisis, but also on general trends of the 
Euro’s restrictions’ effect on national economies (Leavy & Hesse-Biber 2011: 258). However, to 
draw such parallels between different nations is not straightforward. One has to take into account 
the vast differences between the different nations of the euro area. Due to these different variables, 
different nations’ economy react quite different to a crisis. One, therefore, should be vary of how 
much one can generalize from the case of Greece. It is also important to note, that in comparison to 
many euro area nations, Greece would be considered a least similar case study, and that it therefore, 
has less explanatory power than a most similar case study. 
By examining the countries’ economic development after the Greek adoption of the Euro and up to 
and immediately following the breakout of the crisis, we aim to show a relation between the Euro 
and economic situation of the analyzed country. To show that we will examine statistics concerning 
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the development of the countries’ GDP and the indebtedness of the country compared to its GDP, 
and furthermore, compare their balance of payments with a focus on their trade balance. 
We choose these statistics as we approach the case with the idea that the Euro enabled Greece to 
borrow and spend more than it would have been able to have it not been member of the euro area, 
due to the negative real interest rate offered by the European Central Bank contra the inflation in 
Greece (Lynn 2010). 
 
Selection of Sources 
We base most of our project on empirical data, which are to be retrieved largely from academic 
journal articles and books published by academic houses. The use of academic literature ensures 
that our data has been peer-reviewed before we use it, and thereby, grant it academic grade validity. 
The validity in turn means that the majority of our empirical material will originate from secondary 
sources. This will enable us to gain a broader perspective of the problem area, with the aid of the 
field’s best scholars. 
However, due to the ever-progressing nature of the problem area, it is necessary to deviate from 
only utilizing academic journals, as some of the more recent events in Greece and the euro area has 
not yet been covered by academics. If we find ourselves, unable to find sufficient academic 
literature, then we opt to use gray literature, defined as academic literature that is not published and 
is, therefore, not necessarily peer-reviewed (Debachere 1995). However, due to gray literature’s 
lesser rigors academic validation, we need to be more cautious about the validity of the data 
presented in the gray literature. This cautiousness also applies to anything retrieved from 
newspapers. 
When judging whether a newspaper article could be a potential useful source it is important to pay 
attention to both the reputation of the author and the publisher, as some newspapers are much less 
reputable than others. We plan to use reputable international newspapers with a specific focus either 
on finances or with dedicated sections on it, such as Der Spiegel, The Guardian and The New York 
Times. These are newspapers that we find reputable which ensures a certain degree of reliability. 
However, to further back any claim put forward by either a newspaper article or any gray literature 
it is necessary to double check it through multiple reliable sources. Due to these inherent 
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characteristics, we refrain, from using such sources for anything other than certain important recent 
events and quotes by actors relevant to our project. 
To fuel our project’s quantitative analysis, we have the aid of the database of the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, OECD, and Eurostat. Those databases provide us with statistical 
datasets to answer our research question. We perceive the data gathered from these databases to be 
as reliable and valid as possible, as it is renowned organizations publishing the statistics. 
 
Operationalization 
The research question concentrates on how the structure of a political union can affect and even 
worsened a crisis in one of the member countries without every member being equally impacted. 
The analysis of the research question is structured so that it is divided into four chapters. The 
theoretical framework and concepts utilized in the analysis is presented in chapter 3. This chapter is 
essential in shaping the understanding of our theoretical approach to our research question. Each 
concept will be explained along with its relevance to the analysis of the Greek crisis.  
The theory will be applied to the subsequent three chapters. The analytical structure of this project 
is divided so that chapter 4 to 6 each revolve around one of the three working questions; one with a 
focus on the euro area, a second with a focus on the Greek debt and a third with a focus on the 
Greek crisis and the structural impairments of the euro area . In chapter 4 we examine the issues 
regarding a common currency and a shared monetary policy implemented amongst a heterogeneous 
union. Additionally, we discuss and analysis the situation in Greece prior to the crisis. Chapter 5 
will focus on the intermediate period after the Greek accession of the euro area to the outbreak of 
the crisis. It will focus on how structures of the euro area enabled Greece to accumulate an 
extraordinary amount debt, and how the supranational politics of the EU affected the national 
politics of Greece. Lastly, the penultimate chapter 6 will be concerned with how the sub-prime 
crisis in USA ended up sparking the Greek sovereign debt crisis and how they potentially could 
escape the crisis. This division of the analysis gives a chronological and logical structure to enable a 
better comprehensive analysis without large leaps in events. 
The conclusion of the analysis will be presented along with a perspectivation on the possible 
solutions to structural problems of the euro area. The conclusion will, furthermore, be used to 
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discuss general EU integration topics, such as loss of national sovereignty and the paradox of 
combined widening and deepening of integration. 
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Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, we outline the theoretical framework of the project as well as define key concepts to 
the understanding of the Greek crisis. These concepts provides the framework that the project 
utilizes to analysis the origins of the Greek sovereign debt crisis and the Greek government’s ability 
to get out of the recession again with respects to the limitation provided by the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
Concepts 
The Euro Area, the Maastricht Treaty and Its Policy Constraints 
The euro area is a union of EU members that has agreed to have a monetary union with a common 
currency, the euro. It came into existence in 1992 with Maastricht Treaty, and the euro took effect 
in 2001. The aim of a single common currency was to increase both political and economic ties 
between the union’s members and thereby further European integration (Mortimer-Lee 1998: 68, 
Colander 2013: 801). 
To converge the national economies’ of the joining members, there was settle upon a list of criteria 
that joining members should fulfill in order to join the euro area, the so-called Maastricht Treaty 
Convergence Criteria (Mortimer-Lee 1998 68). The Convergence Criteria was placed to ensure a 
homogenous union. The homogenization an important step due to the introduction of the European 
Central Bank, who conduct all of the euro area’s monetary policies, resulting in no monetary policy 
available for the national government to tinker with. The primary goal of the European Central 
Bank is to ensure the price stability of the Euro (Stiglitz & Walsh 2002: 445, 452). This in turn 
mean that the national governments only have control over the fiscal policy and thereby, have less 
tools to manage their national economy both through growth and through recessions (Stiglitz & 
Walsh 2002: 346, 416). 
The European Central Bank, furthermore, sets the interest rate of the euro area, which means that 
the European Central Bank has to set an interest rate that is fitting for both Germany and Greece. 
The common interest rate in turn means that Greece has been able to borrow money from the 
European Central Bank with Greek bonds cheaply (Colander 2013: 810). 
It is important to understand how the euro area both enable and restrict its members, as it is key to 
understanding why Greece was able to accumulate such a massive debt, and why Greek politicians 
were less suited to prevent the crisis. The inability of either the Greek government or the European 
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Central Bank to control both the fiscal and monetary policies is a potential disastrous combination 
(Jespersen 2002: 199). 
 
Aggregate Demand, Unemployment, Money Wages and Productivity 
Aggregate demand describes the total demand within a market, such as the Greek economy. 
Aggregate demand is in classical economic theory closely knitted with the market’s aggregate 
supply so that they in between themselves self-regulate. Keynesians’ instead argued that by 
stimulating aggregate demand in times of recession a government can decrease the effect of the 
recession upon the economy and vice versa in periods of economic growth. This is done to smooth 
out the difference between booms and busts within an economy (Keynes 1935: 25, Hunt & 
Lautzenheiser 2011: 402). 
Market’s rate of unemployment is directly affected by the aggregate demand, as business owners 
will employ more workers insofar as there is an excess of aggregate demand compared to aggregate 
supply. This means that the business owner employ more workers to increase the business’ supply 
output to exploit the lack of supply within the market, resulting in a lower rate of unemployment 
(Keynes 1935: 250, Stiglitz & Walsh 2002: 323). 
Unemployment furthermore, influences the increase in money wages in an inversely proportional 
manner. The proportionality means that if unemployment falls then the rate at which money wages 
of the workers rises will increase, and if unemployment rises then the money wages will increase at 
a slower rate. The logic behind it is that if there is low unemployment, then there is a low supply on 
the labor market, mean that the potential employee has a better ability negotiate a higher money 
wage, as there are a smaller amount of competitors to the prospects’ position. This of course also, 
functions in reverse, so that if there is high unemployment, then potential employees has less 
bargaining power due to a higher supply than demand in the labor market. This correlation between 
money wages and unemployment is also known as the Phillips curve (Phillips 1958, Stiglitz & 
Walsh 2002: 323, Chang 2014: 77). 
It is worth noting that money wages are sticky in the sense that they do not adjust instantaneously to 
changes in the rate of unemployment due to several factors such as contracts, minimum wages and 
labor unions. The stickiness of money wages means that there can be quite a time lag between 
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changes in the rate of employment and the corresponding change in money wages (Stiglitz 2002: 
267). 
An increase in money wages will necessarily increase the production cost of a business’ products, 
as long as there is no change in the productivity of the laborer. Low unemployment will, therefore, 
result in a diminished competitiveness of the national market, decreasing the export power of the 
country. It is, therefore, important for an economy that is experiencing low unemployment to hone 
its competitiveness, or else its export power will be greatly reduced (Stiglitz & Walsh 219, 269). 
It is important to understand how these economic parameters influence one and another as it give 
one the ability to understand why Greece’s stimulation of the aggregate demand did not create a 
stable economic growth, and why the Greek government has difficulties with increasing the 
competitiveness of Greek exports. 
 
Balance of Trade and How to Affect a Trade Deficit 
A nation’s balance of trade is the difference between exports and imports. The nation’s balance of 
trade can, therefore, be either a surplus or a deficit depending on nation’s exports and imports. It is 
not inherently bad for a nation’s balance of trade to be a deficit but does mean that nation needs to 
borrow money from foreign investors by selling assets, stocks or bonds. It is, therefore, essential for 
a nation running a trade balance deficit over a longer period to have a continuous stream of foreign 
income (Keynes 1935: 333, Colander 2013: 794, 820).  
The value of a nation’s assets, stocks and bonds can in the event of an economic crisis plummet 
heavily due to a sudden rush of uncertainty, resulting in a massive unpaid debt from all of the 
previous loans. When it is no longer possible to finance the nation’s over-consumption of imported 
goods due to the lack of foreign investors, then the aggregate demand severely decreases leading to 
a recession (Stiglitz & Walsh 2002: 293, Hunt & Lautzenheiser 2011: 399, Colander 2013:420). 
A nation’s trade deficit will in the event of a recession have to be reduced, insofar, as it is unable to 
boost its aggregate demand through a foreign capital injection, such as a bailout package. The 
aggregate import of a nation can be decreased through the use of contractionary fiscal or monetary 
policies (Stiglitz & Walsh 2002: 303, Colander 2013: 823).  
A contractionary fiscal policy is implemented by cutting public spending and increasing taxation, so 
that the total revenue income of taxation becomes greater than the aggregate public expenditures, 
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meaning that government debt can be paid off. Contractionary fiscal policy is also known as 
austerity (Colander 2013: 824). An increase of taxation of the population will also inevitably 
decrease the aggregate income and thereby, decrease the aggregate import while the aggregate 
export remains unaffected (Colander 2013: 822). The use of a contractionary fiscal policy suffers 
from a political inside lag as austerity is a politically unpopular policy. This means that the process 
of implementing spending cuts and higher taxation can either take a very long time or only be 
politically possible once the economy has suffered severely (Stiglitz & Walsh 2002: 440, Colander 
Colander 2013: 820). 
A contractionary monetary policy is on the other hand relatively easier to implement, and does, 
therefore, not suffer from the same degree of inside lag. It does, however, suffer from an outside lag 
as its effect on the trade balance is less immediate (Stiglitz & Walsh 2002: 440, Davidson 2011: 
239). A contractionary monetary policy is implemented by reducing the supply of money by 
increasing the national interest rate. This means that it becomes more costly, and, therefore, less 
desirable to borrow capital, which in return decreases the aggregate import of the nation (Stein 
2008, Colander 2013: 824). It is, however, not possible for any member of the euro area to conduct 
a contractionary monetary policy due to the common monetary policy determined by the European 
Central Bank (Mortimer-Lee 1998: 69). 
The aggregate import of a nation can, therefore, be managed through the use of contractionary 
policies. The aggregate export will on the other hand automatically increase during recession, 
insofar as the exchange rate of the national currency is not actively fixed, such as with the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and cannot be devalued by the a national central bank. Once a 
nation experiences a recession the trust in its currency and thereby, the value of the currency will 
depreciate (EU 1992). This in turn means that national exporters become more competitive 
compared to their foreign competitors as their products, with the more favorable exchange rate, 
becomes less expensive to export. The increased competitiveness will naturally increase the 
aggregate export and reduce the trade deficit (Colander 2013: 822). 
It is necessary to understand how the balance of trade is affected by different macroeconomic 
mechanisms to then understand how a nation’s ability to reduce a trade deficit is limited when it 
does not possess access to all of these mechanisms. This is especially true with regards to Greece, 
as it only has the power to change its fiscal policy, to be blunt, and, therefore, has less 
maneuverability when faced with a deficit. 
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To measure the trade balance of Greece we use its current account data. The trade balance of a 
country is, however, not exactly the same as its current account, but is instead the largest part of it. 
This means that while a statistic of Greece’s current account does not equal a statistics of its trade 
balance, it does, however, indicate rather precisely trends in the trade balance of Greece (Stein 
2008). 
 
Real Interest Rates 
Real interest rates are the nominal interest rates adjusted for national inflation, which means that 
adjusted for the increase in the income of the debtors. This means that the actual cost of a loan can 
be lower than that of nominal interest rate. It is the central bank who decides the interest rate of a 
nation. This means that the central bank sets the interest rate according to the inflation rate and the 
need for an aggregate demand stimulus. The ability to set the interest rate, therefore, becomes a way 
to influence the aggregate demand of a nation (Stiglitz & Walsh 2002: 84, Malkiel 2008, Colander 
2013: 557). 
It is the European Central Bank that sets the common interest rate of all of the euro area, which 
means that both the wealthiest and poorest members of the euro area can borrow from the European 
Central Bank at the same rate of interest. Inflation, however, is national, which can, and did, result 
in a situation where the inflation is higher than the interest rate, which means that the real interest 
rate is negative. The negative real interest rates mean that the creditor essentially is willing to pay 
the debtor to borrow money, making the loan cost-free (Lynn 2011: 67). 
Real interest rate is an important concept to grasp when trying to explain how Greece was able to 
accumulate such a massive amount of debt. It shows how some of the poorer countries of the euro 
area, due to their higher inflation rate, can borrow inane amount of capital to boost their spending. 
 
Political Business Cycles 
Political Business Cycles is a theory of incumbent politicians behavior put forth by Nordhaus 
(1975). It argues that the economy of a national is affect by the election cycle. The economy will in 
the period after the election experience contractionary economic policies, through higher taxes, 
unemployment and cuts in public services. The contractionary policies will continue until a new 
election is imminent, where the incumbents will then pursue expansionary economic policies by 
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lowering taxes and unemployment while increasing public spending on social welfare. This 
alternation between contractive and expansionary policies is done to increase the chances of the 
incumbent to remain in office after the upcoming election, as the parameters above are crucial for 
the voters’ opinion of the incumbent’s ability to control the economy. This creates a cyclic pattern 
of contractionary and expansionary policies in policies (Nordhaus 1975, Drazen 2000). 
It is however, unstainable to stimulate the economy with the goal of affecting the short-term results, 
as it requires using part of the public budget that is not available, and furthermore increasing money 
wages which then affects inflation (Nordhaus 1975). It is therefore assumed within the theory that 
all actors are rational, both voters and incumbents, and that they, therefore, pursue the possible 
living standards, in case of the voters, and to remain in office, in case of the incumbents. Its 
furthermore, assumed that the incumbents is less concerned with the long-term performance of the 
country if the incumbent can remain in office in the short term, and that the voter is more concerned 
with their current economic situation compared to that at the start of the election cycle. (Nordhaus 
1975, Hibbs 1989: 255). 
Brender and Drazen (2005 & 2007) that younger democracies are more vulnerable to the cyclic 
pattern of political business cycles due to a lesser experience with democratic elections and lesser 
economic transparency compared to established democracies (Brender & Drazen 2005). Brender 
and Drazen (2005) furthermore, classifies Greece as being a new democracy, partly due to the seven 
years ruling by the Greek military junta from 1967 to 74, which means that Greece is vulnerable to 
political business cycles. 
What is peculiar to Greece, and the rest of the euro area, is that the government cannot influence the 
rate of unemployment through expansionary monetary policies due to the euro area’s common 
monetary policy. Greece lower the unemployment rate by stimulating the aggregate demand 
through foreign loans which is made possible by the negative real interest rate of the European 
Central Bank (Stiglitz & Walsh 2002: 445, 452, Lynn 2011: 62). 
It is important to understand how political business cycles influence the economy of Greece, and 
how European Central Bank’s monopoly on the conduct of the Greek monetary policy affects the 
political business cycles within Greece, as it is partially accountable for the accumulation of debt 
after the accession. 
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Chapter 4 – The Euro and Its Implementation 
This chapter will present the underlying thoughts and ideas prior to the implementation of the Euro. 
It will additionally investigate inherent problems with the euro area and the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
The Time Leading Up to the Implementation of the Euro 
The European Union was constituted long before the euro area came into existence. The idea of the 
Euro was expressed in the Werner Plan in the 1970’s, where it was thought that the Euro would be 
implemented as a shared currency across the union within a decade. However, the reality differed. 
Politicians were afraid of surrendering too much of the nation’s sovereignty, leaving most of them 
with a lessened national identity (Lane 2012). 
It was just prior to the 1990’s the Maastricht monetary union path was initiated, combining the 
currency with the institution resulting in a stronger union. The Maastricht treaty was signed in 1992 
with no real political coordination regarding the monetary union’s policies. It was believed that the 
monetary union would take care of itself obviating the need for any enforcement (Patrick 2010: 4).   
Up until the Euro was implemented as a common currency in the euro area there had been many 
negotiations. The negotiations were a concern with the financial aid a country could expect in case 
of a severe recession. The European Commission agreed upon not giving any country help if needed 
in time of crises; this was conducted through the Stability and Growth Pact, which contained a no-
bail out clause. If a nation did not meet the criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty, it would result in a 
sovereign default. (Lane 2012). 
National interests have always been a concern in the European Union, even though the union has 
moved towards being a more integrated institution. This thought of a united union led to a belief 
that the national interest were best perceived and achieved through alignment (Patrick 2010: 5). 
The euro area is an agreement between 17 member states of adopting a single currency between 
them and a common central bank European Central Bank. The rationale for employing a common 
currency was to develop further a political, long-standing and united union. The thought was that 
the Euro would raise the living standard across Europe and make Europe a more efficient actor on 
the global market (Ahearn et al. 2012). Other benefits were seen as lowering the expenses of inter-
European trade. The elimination of the transaction costs by removing exchange rate risk, price 
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saving due to a more competitive market, and the idea was for the Euro to become a reserve 
currency of international finance (Clarke, Stephen & Daley, Claire 2010, Ahearn et al. 2012). 
The model established by the European Union had some issues with regards to the monetary and 
fiscal policies. Would this simplification of a common currency across borders be successful and 
would the national interest overtake the idea of shared goal of enhance every member state’s 
national potential (Patrick 2010: 5)? – This will be discussed further in the following part of the 
chapter. 
 
The Differences between the Member Countries of the Euro Area 
The euro area is a union of several countries, each member different from one and another, which is 
easily viewed if you divide the union into a north and a south, where most of the northern countries 
have a more or less healthy economy and the southern countries are under pressure because of their 
unhealthy economy (Jaumotte & Sodsriwiboon 2010, Lane 2012). It is no coincidence that the 
Mediterranean countries where the ones most affected by the financial crisis. Even before the crisis 
entered they had severe debt issues, where Italy and Greece particular stood out. Both Greece and 
Italy had debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 % and have never achieved the fiscal goal of a debt-to-GDP 
ratio under 60 % set in the Maastricht Treaty (Lane 2012). The lack of compliance with the criteria 
was an issue even before the Euro was implemented, as members differed too much economically. 
The initial state of the economies carried on over to after the implementation of the euro resulting in 
an unbalanced situation from the beginning. Greece ran with a large external deficit while Germany, 
on the other hand, had large surpluses equaling an account balance in the union close to zero (Lane 
2012).  
 
Something the European Union and then by default the Euro countries cannot single handily be held 
responsible for is the crisis that arose in the late 2000’s across the Western hemisphere (Lane 2012). 
When the crisis occurred, the leaders of Europe had troubles proposing a collective and uniform 
solution to the crisis (Bastasin 2012: 73). As a result of this ever changing world economy, the 
previous monetary hegemonies are facing difficulties whereas growth is experienced in Asia. This 
has affected the Euro as a currency where it before the crisis was a reliable currency it is now 
looked at with a great deal of uncertainty (Lane 2012).  
The differences between the different Euro countries were only enlarged by the introduction of the 
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Euro as a common currency. The expectation was the Euro would minimize the differences between 
the economies, but the absence of a fiscal policy with fiscal compensation, caused greater 
imbalances between the countries, and structural differences results in deeper economics 
imbalances but also different approaches to economy policies (Bastasin 2012:73). 
The differences is grounded in the structure of each member country, where Germany have a solid 
and strong structure, their corporations are more prominent within their market and are therefore 
less prone to bust, whereas countries such as Greece and Italy have smaller corporations that are 
affected harder by shocks in the economy (Bastasin 2012: 75). 
When the crisis occurred the magnitude of the growth differed between the different member 
countries. The varying degrees of spending was caused by the structure of the country and financed 
in Greece mainly by foreign capital, where other member countries could finance their spending 
through the domestic capital. The main difference was caused by the difference in the sectors the 
spending was aimed at, some countries saw it more beneficial or necessary to focus on real estate or 
the stock market, others believed that the spending should be aimed at the fiscal sector and 
consumer durables. These differences in spending influenced the potential for a bust and how big an 
impact the bust would have on the specific member (Balcerowicz 2014). 
 
Issues with Regards to the Euro Area 
The Euro is, as stated beforehand, a common currency of 17 countries in the euro area. The Euro 
has, arguably, some advantages but certainly also some disadvantages. One of them being that 
every country with the Euro as their currency is under the same monetary policies meaning that 
every euro member is expected to meet the same criteria. The issue concerning this is the 
differences flowing from the different countries and their differences in the economy. Simply put, 
there are too many differences between the euro area members to have one single monetary policy 
(Lane 2012). 
The Euro was before the crisis occurred, a currency that was considered reliable, this changed and 
the perception by the Congress of the United States of America changed as well. They began to 
question the structure of the euro area and the separation of monetary and fiscal policies. The 
argument is that the weak fiscal discipline enforced by the European Commission have resulted in 
rising public debt over the years, which in the end hurts the nation based on the lack of 
opportunities to offset this debt. Because of the agreement of the Maastricht Treaty, the member 
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countries are not able to inflate or devaluate their currency to become more competitive in the 
global market (Ahearn et al. 2012). 
One of the criteria set forth by the European Union to measure success was the number of members, 
who implemented the currency. This was by any means an oversimplification that resulted in 
agreeing to accept weaker applications such as Italy and especially Greece, who falsified its records 
(Mortimer-Lee 1998: 69, Patrick 2010: 6). 
The second issue was that these weak members of the Euro when accepted were able to borrow at 
the same interest rate as strong members, such as Germany, could. This roughly translated into a 
spending without second thoughts from the weaker members. By accepting more applicants, more 
seats in the European Commission were occupied, effectively damaging the decision-making 
process, as more members meant enforcing new criteria more difficult (Patrick 2010: 6).  
The Maastricht Treaty has since it was signed become outdated, as the threat of no bailouts or the 
action of financial markets was enough to prevent any bailouts needed and as such the treaty 
became insufficient. Furthermore, it was not specified which procedures were to be followed in case 
of a need for inter-European economic rescue. Possibly the biggest issue regarding the Euro and the 
policies behind the currency was the weak economic governance employed. There were no strict 
penalties to the members who violated the treaty, mainly because the members were afraid it would 
hurt themselves. There were no strict penalties employed by the strong Euro members, France, and 
Germany, in the treaty because they experienced difficulties in the early 1990’s. France and 
Germany are now experiencing the consequences of these early weaknesses and the weak economic 
governance employed at the beginning of the Maastricht Treaty (Patrick 2010: 7).  
In more recent years, it has become more evident that size also matters in the European Union. It 
has long been stated that every country in the European Union was equal, but this does not hold 
true. The disproportional distribution of power could eventually resulting in the smaller countries 
making their voices heard through vetoing valid suggestions from the EU (Patrick 2010: 7).  
The European Central Bank mismanaged the crisis by dealing with all sovereign debt as equal and 
not differentiate between the member countries and their economic and political situation, which led 
to a misunderstanding in the market. Furthermore, both the nominal and real interest rates were 
suppressed in Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy amongst others. This resulting in a demand for credit by 
the members and prior to 2008 these countries exhibited a greater inflation than the more stable 
countries such as Germany (Balcerowicz 2014, ECB 2012) . 
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These above mentioned tendencies were in general helped forward by the lenient monetary policies 
implemented by the European Central Bank, by both the international and domestic regulations that 
rewarded and encouraged risky behavior from the bank officiating loans and the borrowers. In 
general the agreed upon fiscal constraints were forgotten and neglected for a period. This meant that 
no procedure was in place to deal with the fiscal, financial and structural issues of the Euro. Instead, 
the procedure was to accumulate and postponed the problems, resulting in a worsened position 
(Criste 2013, Balcerowicz 2014). As stated previously stated the European Central Bank have to 
navigate between all of the Euro member’s economic situation. They have come up with official 
interventions, which led to late assessments of the economic state of the different members, this has 
previously mentioned resulted in suppressed interest rates (Balcerowicz 2014). 
Related to this is the fallacy that reforms is only beneficial in the long-term. The assumption by the 
European Central Bank is that bailouts are the only and a sufficient way of dealing with increased 
deficits. However, Balcerowicz (2014) then argues that well-structured and credibly implemented 
reforms can benefit both in the short and long run. In the short-term it will benefit from enhanced 
growth potential and increased the resilience of the economy. In the long-term, he argues that the 
effects will be from increased confidence in the country and its ability to maintain and uphold its 
economy, resulting in a lower interest rate. Financial markets cannot be treated the same, as they 
react differently to different reforms and changes it is important to look at how these reforms are 
implemented and by which degree, this has been apparent during the reforms provided by the 
PIIGS’ governments (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) (Balcerowicz 2014).  
Issues that first arose after the implantation and first after the crisis had occurred was the discussion 
concerning bailouts for the different PIIGS countries. The conflict was concerning the scale of the 
bailout and the consequences of official lending and if a potential bailout could prevent any impact 
of the crisis (Balcerowicz 2014). First and foremost, the Euro was by the Maastricht Treaty not 
allowed to implement bailouts, but when they then accepted the need for a bailout it came far too 
late, as the crisis already had been terrorizing Greece. The issue concerning the no-bail out clause as 
a structural part of the Euro is an issue as it has been ignored. This has come to the discussion if the 
euro area’s institutional arrangements are built to comprehend a potential crisis. When they decided 
to bailout Greece issues arose again. A problem such as moral hazard now became apparent, which 
increased the policy-induced crisis and bailouts (Criste 2013, Balcerowicz 2014). 
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When the structural framework of the Euro was under construction, many argued against the 
exclusion of devaluation as an adjustment device, as it was thought to damage the countries’ ability 
to prevent crises. This was neglected, leaving the countries with the option to reduce the growth of 
wages and prices in context to other countries, which is inherently more difficult than a devaluation, 
now they need to implement reforms on a national level to change the financial status quo. This 
cannot have come as a surprise before the implementation of the no devaluation clause in the Euro 
leading to the question of, why was this seen as a necessary to implement? The clause only made it 
more difficult and expensive for the members to regulate their economy to react quickly to a 
potential crisis, with no real upside to the clause (Balcerowicz 2014). 
As a result of the implementation of the Euro the governments of Greece, Spain and Portugal all 
announced reforms that would make their labor and product markets more prone to changes. These 
reforms would have been less likely had they not agreed to a common currency as the Euro 
(Balcerowicz 2014). 
With regards to the euro area and the exception of a fiscal union, this project argues that this is one 
of the main issues with the euro. Balcerowicz (2014) argues that a fiscal policy must be implanted 
into the euro area for it to withstand the threats and issues from outside. Balcerowicz has two 
interpretations of a fiscal union. One being the existence of effective fiscal constraints towards 
members, which are not meeting the agreed criteria’s for the euro area but it could also be regarding 
an agreed cross-regional fiscal policy so every member had almost the same if not the same fiscal 
policy to relate to or it could be both of the previously mentioned ideas. This implementation of a 
shared fiscal policy across borders would ensure a more united and stronger Europe, which would 
have a stronger currency as well with a strong central arrangement and structure, where every 
member would have a clear understanding of which rules to follow resulting in less confusion and 
more discipline. The euro area has tried to implement some fiscal policies, as the Fiscal Treaty, but 
the results and efficiency are still very much up for discussion (Balcerowicz 2014). Balcerowicz’ 
(2014) solution to stabilize the Eurozone again is by an increase in the monitoring of the member’s 
governments and an increase in cross-borders fiscal transfer. He then goes on to argue for the origin 
of the crisis. He believes that the structure of the Euro at the implementation caused financial 
booms resulting in bad fiscal policy-making as a consequence of easy money. The delayed 
intervention from the European Central Bank made the crisis more costly for Greece and other 
countries, and this is something that has to be removed for the Euro to become a strong currency 
again. 
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This section will leave the reader with the two biggest issues concerning the Euro, which already 
has been discussed previously to some extent. The first is the statement “One monetary policy 
cannot fit all.” (Balcerowicz 2014 p. 475). The second is that a monetary union needs and requires a 
fiscal union (Balcerowicz 2014). This is important because if the different member countries 
conduct different fiscal policies inside their borders the monetary policy will affect the members in 
various degrees. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, we explored the Euro and the time prior to the implementation. The analysis was 
grounded in the differences throughout the euro area and the structural issues with the Euro as a 
common currency. The idea of a common currency across the countries in the euro area was and 
still is a great idea. It unifies the Union, minimize the risk of a potential outbreak of war and enlarge 
the interdependency between members. The issues arose when the structural ideas for this shared 
currency came into action. The concept of one monetary policy for all the different members 
became too unified and too simple. The differences in the euro area were too prominent and the 
economic position prior to the implementation only increased these issues. North and south was 
divided; the North had a stable economy where the south fell into recession. A separation in the 
euro area had occurred, and the national interest was now more important than the greater good. 
The idea behind the Euro was great, but the execution lacked because of national interests. No 
country wanted to make the great commitment to the Euro because of the fear of transferring their 
sovereignty to the European Union resulting in a half-hearted attempt. One of the biggest mistakes 
the European Union made was at what ease they accepted countries, such as Greece and Italy, to 
join the euro area even when they did not meet the criteria put forward by the Maastricht Treaty 
themselves. 
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Chapter 5 – Accumulation of Debt and Unwillingness to Adjust 
This chapter will investigate how the Greek accession enabled Greece to end on the verge of a 
sovereign default due to indebtedness. It will look at the European Commission inability to coerce 
the different Greek governments to restructure the Greek economy, and how this inability to 
influence Greek politics led to continuous political business cycles and ostrich-like behavior 
(Panagiotarea 2013: 119, Fouskas & Dimoulas 2012), only worsened by two populist parties to 
which the government power fluctuated between (Papas 2013). Through the analysis of the Greek 
economy, and policy implementation concerning it, in the years between the accession and the crisis 
this chapter will highlight why Greece ended in such a dire situation in late 2009. 
 
The Years Following the Greek Accession 
With its accession in 2001, Greece entered a motley union, where Greece itself was the black sheep 
(Herz & Kotios 2000). Greece had somehow managed to alter its economy sufficiently from being 
mismanaged to be accepted to join the euro area. After being judged economically unfit for the euro 
area in 1997, due to not being in compliance with the Maastricht Treaty Convergence Criteria 
(Mortimer-Lee 1998: 69), Greece went on to fulfill the Criteria in 1999. In a time span of only two 
years, Greece had managed to lower its inflation rate from 5,2 % to 2 %, with a reference value of 
2,4 %, the deficit-to-GDP ratio from 4 % to 1,6 %, the interest rate of long-term bonds from 9,8 % 
to 6,4 %, which is 8 % lower than the three best performing countries within the euro area, and 
lastly, Greece had managed to not devaluate the Drachma. Greece had thereby complied with four 
out of five of the Maastricht Criteria. The Greek public debt was still however, far above the 60 % 
of the GDP required, but had decreased by 4,7 % to a public debt level of 104,4 % of the GDP, 
which was considered a satisfactory positive development (Mortimer-Lee 1998: 69, Herz & Kotios 
2000, Polasek & Amplatz 2003). 
Greece had in a manner of years reversed its economy and now only had to continue the positive 
development. Moreover, Greece had all the possibilities to do so with the cheap loans provided by 
the European Central Bank (Panagiotarea 2013: 97). Greece had however also, begun a spending 
spree of quite a magnitude. Starting by launching a ‘social package’ to help low-income pensioners 
and other socially vulnerable groups of the society along with increased public spending on civil 
servant’s wages and cuts in some taxes (Panagiotarea 2013: 101). To accompany the increased 
public spending, Greece also chose to host the 2004 Olympics, estimating a cost of 5,9 billion US $, 
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but it quickly rose 15 billion US $ after the Games were held in Athens, as there was build new 
stadiums to facilitate the Games, along with a new airport and subway system. For a country 
surviving on borrowed money, this extravagant spending was all but sustainable (Lynn 2011: 117). 
It was discovered in 2004 that the economic numbers on which the Greek euro area application had 
to be reviewed upon was false. Due to an omission of certain parts of the Greek budget, it meant 
that the Greek yearly deficit since 1997 had on average been 2,1 % lower than in reality. Thus 
Greece had been admitted into the euro area without fulfilling the Maastricht Treaty Criteria, as it 
also meant that Greece indebtedness rose to 107 %, and nor had Greece fulfilled the Criteria ever 
since the accession (Lynn 2011: 118, Panagiotarea 2013: 99). 
Greece had broken the Maastricht Treaty but was not to be penalized for the breach of conduct, as 
there was no fitting sentence to sentence Greece. There is simply no logical way to penalize the 
Greek economy, as it in any case only would do more harm to an already ill Greek economy. The 
European Commission did not have any way to deter euro area members from bad economic 
practice, with its only weapon being exclusion from the euro area. But excluding Greece from the 
euro area would have had created an unpredictable wave of uncertainty towards the stability of the 
Euro, which would have affected all of the euro area (Lynn 2011:188, Panagiotarea 2013: 100). 
This highlights a major flaw of the euro area, as it was not able to cope with moral hazardous 
behavior from its member countries. Exclusion being the only, and last solution meant that the 
Commission only could hope that members would perform within the Maastricht Criteria. The 
Commission did not have the legal power to converge the economy of the euro area members, 
which was apparent, as Greece was not the only country to not comply with the Criteria (Ngai 
2012). 
 
Continuous Greek Indebtedness and the European Attempt to Turn It Around 
While it came as no surprise “[…] that the Greek governments were prone to some accounting 
creativity [which] had been common knowledge for years” (Bastasin 2012: 121), the European 
Commission still inquired Greece to lower its debt through fiscal reforms, and placed Greece in the 
so-called Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which function was to carefully observe the Greek 
compliance with the Maastricht Treaty Criteria (Panagiotarea 2013: 104, 114). Due to the large 
expenditures of the Greek government compared to the relative small revenue, the debt had to be 
covered by external loans, which was made easily available due to the negative real interest rate of 
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the European Central Bank (Lynn 2011: 62, Appendix B). The reforms were to decrease the 
government expenditures by decreasing pensions, social welfare and minimum wages, and increase 
the government revenues by increasing taxation by decreasing the rate of tax evasion, which is a 
major problem in Greece (Lynn 2011: 120, Taylor 2011, Panagiotarea 2013: 114). 
The European Commission does, however, not have any say in national fiscal policies of the euro 
area members, which means that the Commission could only suggest policy changes to the Greek 
government and hope that it would listen. However, within lies one of the pitfalls of euro area; the 
lack of judicial power to control the fiscal policies of its member countries (Fahey & Bardutzky 
2013). Given that the Greek government is elected by the Greek people, the incumbent politicians 
has little incentive to follow suggestions from the European Commission, which holds especially 
true when such suggestions would harm the average Greek voters livelihood. Nowhere else is this 
more evident than in the political business cycles emerging throughout contemporary Greek 
political history whenever an election was imminent (Milas 2000, Panagiotarea 2013: 111). This is 
of course an inherent problem with short-term incumbent politicians, as they need public support to 
stay in office, which results in an economic illusion that is created by practicing expansionary 
economic policies to create a favorable option towards the incumbent government and thereby, 
increasing the chance of reelection. In Greece’s case, due to the common monetary policy of the 
euro area, the only economic policy toolset available was to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy, 
which meant that the incumbent government increased public spending to lower taxation and 
minimum, and inflation to decrease unemployment  (Panagiotarea 2013: 111). 
These political business cycles resulted in two things: It did first and foremost, harm the Greek 
economy, as it resulted in a period of unsustainable foreign borrowing due to a public spending 
increase, which was in turn enabled by the negative real interest rates of the European Central Bank. 
In addition, the period after the elections did not involve harsh enough reductions in public 
spending to equal the pre-election, which meant that the Greek public debt increased steadily 
(Appendix A, Panagiotarea 2013: 111). It is also worth noting that such political business cycles 
become more vicious in countries where the incumbent government has a better ability to influence 
the short term economic outlook, which are often the case in newer democracies (Brender & Drazen 
2005). Secondly, the political business cycles also meant that incumbent politicians had a small 
period of time to actually implement policies suggested by the European Commission, as a Greek 
election cycle of four years only allows, for at best, two years of rest between each election cycle 
(Bonfiglioli & Gancia 2013, Panagiotarea 2013: 113). The election cycle length may, therefore, 
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results in an insufficient incentive to reform the Greek fiscal structure compared to continue the 
spending spree. 
This is also, what happen, as the Greek debt only increased in the period from the accession to the 
outbreak of the crisis, and the reveal of the bad economic outlook did nothing to change the Greek 
government’s behavior. The political business cycles kept on occurring, as is evident from figure 1 
as public spending rose significantly preceding an election year, and did not decrease enough to 
suffice a status quo. The public debt peaked right before the outbreak of the crisis, where it reached 
a staggering 133,2 %, which essentially means that Greece was indebted by an excess of one-third 
of its GDP. The debt, furthermore, means that swayed persistently away from ever complying with 
the Maastricht Criteria. Even though the Greek deficit fluctuated greatly during the 2000’s, with a 
lot of years wherein the debt decreased, it still amounted to an average deficit of 3,1 % from 2001 to 
2009, which is not in compliance with the Maastricht Criteria. The average deficit is largely due to 
the large deficit leading up to the 2009 election, where the public debt increased by 16,8 % 
(Appendix A). 
 
Figure 1: Compiled from Appendix A 
 
It is difficult to determine what exactly this development can be attributed to, but the 11,1 % 
increase in public debt from 2001 to 2009 does, however, suggest that the admission into the euro 
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area only worsened the public debt of Greece (Appendix A). It is, however, reasonable to argue that 
this negligence of the Greek economy can in part be attributed to the myopia of Greek politicians. 
The miserable condition of the Greek current account can however, be attributed to the negative real 
interest rates of the European Central Bank, as the deficit increased from 7,2 % of the Greek GDP 
in 2001, equaling to 9,8 billion US $, to 14,7 % in its peak of 2008, equaling a deficit of 51,2 billion 
US $. Due to Greek’s relatively high inflation compared to the rest euro area, Greece was able to 
borrow money without paying interest rates, which explains why Greece’s current account deficit 
worsened by a large margin in the years after the accession (Appendix E, Lynn 2011: 62, Gonzales-
Garcia and Grigoli 2013, Balcerowicz 2014). 
 
The Vicious Spiral of Artificial Aggregate Demand 
 
Figure 2: Appendix C 
With the increased aggregate demand, artificially created by the large amount of foreign 
borrowings, unemployment fell significantly from 11,2 % in 2001 to 7,3 % in 2008 as a direct 
consequence lack of supply to accommodate the increased demand (Appendix C & D). The increase 
in employment meant that the money wages paid to the employed Greeks increased as 
unemployment decreased, which meant that the cost of production increased as evident from figure 
2. The increased cost of production is critical as the labor cost of a Greek compared to a German 
worker differed with approximately 20 % in 2007 (Higgins & Klitgaard 2011). The labor cost 
meant that the Greek competitiveness fell dramatically compared to that of Germany, as production 
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became increasingly more costly. Greece’s reduced competitiveness compared to Germany, and 
other euro area countries, hindered Greek exporters’ ability to export goods from Greece, and 
Greece’s export growth compared to its trading partners import growth fell exclusively from the 
time of the accession and until the crisis. Greece’s export decreased by about 25 %, and had 
decreased noticeably more than other of the euro area countries (Figure 3), which meant that 
Greece’s competitiveness had suffered a massive blow (Higgins & Klitgaard 2001, Xiao, Schule & 
Bennett 2008). 
 
 
Figure 3 (Chart 7) & 4 (Chart 8): Higgins & Klitgaard 2001: 6 
 
In normal circumstances, a country with a withering export power would target its national 
currency’s exchange rate so that it would devaluate compared to other major currencies resulting in 
a lowered cost of export compared to its foreign competitors. This would either be done automatic 
by the market power, as the trust in the national currency would fall due to the decreasing 
competitiveness of the nation’s exports, which would depreciate the currency compared to other 
currencies. The national bank could on the other hand target the exchange rate of its currency by 
devaluing it to increase its export power and thereby, its competitiveness compared to its 
competitors (Arghyrou & Chortareas 2008, Higgins & Klitgaard 2011). 
The problem is, not surprisingly, that Greece has no power over the exchange rate of the Euro. The 
Euro is instead, valued based on the performance of all of the euro area, which means that its value 
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needs to accommodate the vast differences of the euro area’s national economies. This means that 
the Euro needs to reflect the competitiveness of a heterogeneous bunch of economies with as large 
differences in their export power as Greece and Germany (Figure 3 & 4). The European Central 
Bank therefore, in essence, need to set the exchange rate of the Euro, so that Greece’s 
competitiveness increases while Germany’s stays the same, so that Germany can import foreign 
goods at a reasonable price. This is a dilemma that is unsolvable, and highlights a flaw in the 
construction of the monetary union. The same holds true for depreciation, as a depreciation would 
be on the basis of both Greece’s and Germany’s economic performance, and therefore, end up not 
reflecting any of the two countries (Arghyrou & Chortareas 2008, Higgins & Klitgaard 2011, Busch 
2012). 
It is furthermore, worth noticing that the importers of Greek goods are members of the euro area 
and vice versa (Böwer, Michou & Ungerer 2014), which means that exchange rate in those trades 
has no impact. Instead, the trade balance between euro area members is determined by the relative 
cost of production. This means due to Greece’s relatively high cost of labor that its competitiveness 
is low (Figure 3), as long as the cost of labor is not offset by increased productivity of the labor 
force. Unfortunately, this is not the case with the Greek laborers’ productivity (Busch 2012, OECD 
2012). The low productivity of the laborerers entails that to increase the competitiveness of Greek 
exports; the labor cost would have to be decreased through wage cuts. But because money wages 
are not easily changeable, e.g. sticky, due to contracts, unions and minimum wages (Stiglitz & 
Walsh 2002: 267), which paired with the lifetime long jobs offered in the public sector makes it 
difficult to restore the Greek competitiveness (Bastasin 2012: 124). 
This furthermore, illustrates why the Greek government had a hard time readjusting its fiscal 
economy to account for its massive, as the early 2000’s had brought with it a massive increase in 
the living standards of the average Greek. This means that to restore the Greek competitiveness, the 
Greek government would have to severely decrease the livelihood of the average Greek laborer, 
something that is surely going to increase the incumbent’s chances of being reelected, as the past is 
easily forgotten with respects to the present (Machiavelli 1532: 31, Busch 2012). 
It is however, worth noting that the unemployment within Greece is increasing (Figure 2), which 
means that given time, the cost of labor will decrease and thereby, increasing the competitiveness of 
Greek exports, in accordance with the Phillip’s curve. However, it is also worth noting that it 
involves a time lag due to the stickiness of money wages (Stiglitz & Walsh 2002: 323). 
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Chapter Conclusion 
We have in this chapter investigated the period from the Greek accession of the euro area in 2001 
up to right before the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, and explained why Greece ended 
in its current economic morass.  
Greece was first and foremost, allowed into the euro area on false promises, at least after the 
revision of the statistics published by the Greek government undermined the Greek compliance with 
Maastricht Treaty Convergence Criteria. This meant that Greece from the moment of accession was 
not economical fit to be a member of the euro area, which highlights the vast heterogeneous nature 
of the euro area. It was furthermore, revealed that Greece, along with many other countries, did not 
comply with the Maastricht Criteria’s yearly requirement to the national fiscal economy of inflation 
and budget deficit. The different economies of the euro area did not experience an increased 
convergence and, therefore, stayed heterogeneous (Milos & Sotiropoulos 2010). 
After the discovery of Greece large debt, the European Commission placed Greece in the EDP 
program, to help Greece stabilize its economy through structural fiscal policy changes. However, 
the initiative did, however, not have a significant impact on the Greek fiscal policy, partly due to the 
lack judicial power of the European Commission and partly due to the myopia of the Greek 
incumbents. The European Commission did not have the power to change the Greek fiscal policy, 
which was an obvious flaw in the euro area, as it allow the Greek government to continue its 
excessive spending spree. Had the European Commission had the ability to control the Greece fiscal 
policy, then it could have prevented the accumulation of debt by enforcing a contractionary fiscal 
policy. 
The incumbent politicians in Greece continued after the accession to inflict political business cycles 
upon the Greek economy. This meant that due to the shortsightedness of the shifting Greek 
politicians, they increased the deficit in the public budget together with tax reliefs in the year 
preceding an election to increase their chance of reelection. The general myopia of Greek 
politicians also meant that no real restructuring of the Greek economy happened due to the fear of 
the voters’ wrath. These circumstances resulted in a further deterioration of the Greek economy.  
While the budget debt worsened, it did not affect Greece’s competitiveness in a positive manner, as 
it also deteriorated along with the economy. The detoriation of the competitiveness was mainly due 
to the artificial rise in the aggregate demand created by the negative real interest rates offered by the 
European Central Bank. The rise in aggregate demand equaled less unemployment that made 
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money wages rise and thereby, also the production cost of Greek export goods. This loss of Greek 
competitiveness was not offset by devaluation or depreciation of the Euro, as it is set centrally by 
the European Central Bank for all member of the euro area. This highlight a structural problem with 
the euro area, as it does not enable countries to target its exchange rate so that it can increase its 
exports, nor can the European Central Bank set an exchange rate that appeases all members. 
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Chapter 6 – The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Restrictions of the Euro 
In this chapter, we will investigate how the constraints of the Maastricht Treaty affected the Greek 
government’s ability to recover from the crisis. We will furthermore, investigate how the 
international financial crisis, which started in the United States, affected the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis as well discuss several different  
 
How Something that Started in the US Affected Greece – The Start of the Greek Crisis 
The international financial crisis was sparked by the US sub-prime crisis in 2007, and had initially 
nothing to do with Greece nor the rest of Europe, and had only a small effect on the yield of Greek 
bonds compared to the yield of bunds (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas 2011, Lynn 201: 128). When the 
international financial crisis peaked in late-2008, the Greek bonds, in similar fashion to the other 
peripheral euro area economies rose to a 2,85 % yield, reflecting a rising lack of belief in the Greek 
economy (Figure 5). This trend was further intensified after the snap election of 2009, where the 
new PASOK-led government announced that the projection of a 6 % budget deficit was rather 
going to be 12,7 %. This resulted in a general disbelief in the Greek ability to pay off its debt, which 
caused a 4,5 % increase in the Greek bond yield compared to the bund (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas 
2011, Panagiotarea 2013: 129). 
 
Figure 5: Arghyreu & Tsoukalas 2011 
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These tendencies made the European Commission and the head of states consider violating the no-
bail out clause of the Maastricht Treaty to restore the confidence in the Greek economy through 
economic aid. There was, however, no consensus amongst the member states, as Germany was 
fiercely against a Greek bailout, largely due to national political incentives (Panagiotarea 2013: 
137). This lack of resolve by the European Commission was translated into even less confidence in 
the Greek bonds. Greece’s credibility further deteriorated as the Greek government announced a 
social welfare reform costing around 1 billion €, which was anything but what the investors wanted, 
and, therefore, led to a critical reduction in the Greek credit rating from the major agencies, and 
thereby, lost yet another increment of credibility (Panagiotarea 2013: 132).  
It was at this point that investors began fearing either a Greek default or a Greek exit from the euro 
area as a consequence of its inability meet the obligations of the Maastricht Criteria. These fears 
had beforehand been neglected by investors as the no-bail out clauses was perceived to not be 
upheld, and that the European Commission, therefore, would not let a country default. But with the 
German fierce vindication of the no-bail out clause, and the Greek unwillingness to reform its 
economy, those two scenarios was all of a sudden no longer a farfetched idea (Arghyreu & 
Tsoukalas 2011, Lynn 2011: 131). This meant that Greek bonds, who had up to this point follow the 
trend of the other PIIGS-countries’ bond, skyrocketed away from the rest of the PIIGS-countries 
landing at 5,86 % (Figure 5). The rise in the yield of the Greek bond led to an increased uncertainty, 
and hence, a smaller government revenue from investments, and furthermore, had the effect that the 
Greek debt increased to 148,3 % in 2010, and continued increase in the succeeding years (Appendix 
A). 
It is clear that the Greek economic misery is not only self-inflicted, but that it, also, can partly be 
attributed to the indecisiveness of the European leaders when deciding the appropriate action to 
tackle the Greek crisis. And this trend continue with the negotiations between the different Greek 
governments and the ‘Troika’ (IMF, European Commission and the European Central Bank), where 
their inability to come agreements boils down to settling on a compromise between economic 
‘shock therapy’ and stimulus (Alderman 2013, Higgins 2013, Chrysoloras & Tugwell 2014, Trindle 
2015).  
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How to Escape the Valley of Economic Death 
As expressed throughout this project, the way policies are conducted in the euro area at the moment 
is inherently unstable. Arguably something needs to change as the construction with comprehensive 
financial transfers from stronger to weaker states is not working out. We propose a more coherent 
union based on the premise similar to the federal governments in the United States with a strong 
political center that could control the agenda for the entire Union (Mayer 2012). At the current state 
the euro area is caught in the middle, it seems like no real decision regarding the Euro has been 
taken. This half-hearted attempt does not benefit anyone that they have separated fiscal and 
monetary policy-making does only seem to confuse. For the euro area to actually benefit its 
members, the decision making has to become strict and ensure more fiscal discipline by the member 
states if not adding fiscal policy decision to the euro area as well (Mayer 2012). 
Policy interventions are needed now more than ever from a European level (Busch 2012, Maris & 
Sklias 2013, Sklias, Roukanas & Maris 2014). The crisis in Greece requires policy intervention 
even though it is against the main pillars of the structure in Europe. The crisis has been intensified 
by expansionary fiscal policy maintained after the Greek accession. Busch (2012) argues, along 
with Panagiotarea (2013: 148), that the current attempts to solve the crisis can be described as 
‘shock therapy’. The austerity measurements applied has done nothing but deepening the crisis and 
have imposed a recession on Europe. At the current time, Europe neglected their non-bailout clause 
in the Maastricht Treaty and came up with a bailout plan for Greece. The rescue packaged has had 
little to zero effect on Greece, as it has been another half-hearted attempt to solve an issue.  
One of the issues, which could be fixed easily, concerning the Euro is the assumption of that the 
market is self-adjusting. If this were not the general assumption by the European Union, they would 
have had more interventions in the economies. Arguably this can be difficult as the different 
member countries have their sovereignty, which the European Union has to respect making an 
intervention difficult. There is a need for an economic system to uphold to entire euro area, and 
before this happens, it will only be a half-hearted attempt as discussed previously. There is a need 
of interventions, which is extremely apparent in the crisis from 2009. It was long-discussed if the 
European Commission should intervene against the constitution in place for the Eurozone members. 
An intervention would ensure a crisis like the one currently challenging the Euro would be eased or 
might even stopped before it got out of hand. The fact that the European Commission neglected 
their constitution and helped the Greek people with a bailout just showcases the need for 
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intervention from the European Commission, but what is the excuse for not intervening at any prior 
given time? – If the intervention had occurred prior to now, Greece would have been a more stable 
position, in need of less financial help and, as a result, would be better suited to escape the crisis. 
This is one of the arguments for a more active monetary union (Mayer 2012). 
The big question the Eurozone has to ask themselves before they continue is what is it that causes 
the members of the Euro to continually overspend, which have resulted in a fiscal-to-financial crisis 
or in public debt that have caused the economy to slow down or even go into reverse. Without a 
shared fiscal policy in the Eurozone, the member states will experience a destructive political 
competition, where spending promises is expected to gather more votes. This competition will 
remain there as long as a fiscal policy from above is neglected. Therefore, the fiscal-to-financial 
crisis is heavily based on political mismanagement. The more similar Europe, and then by essence 
the euro area can become, the bigger a voice it will become and stronger it will stand (Balcerowicz 
2014).  
Another critique Busch (2012) has of the euro area is the debt haircut they forced on Greece, which 
have caused the financial markets to run wild. The haircut resulted in Greece that was supposed to 
encompass 21 % of private bonds. It was all intended as a voluntary swap of bonds that would 
ensure Greece’s financial future. It also came as far as to the European Commission structuring a 
growth plan for Greece where European Investment Bank loans and funds were available. If the 
European Commission wants to solve the issue they either had to invest larger funds into the Greek 
economy, implement a strong fiscal policy for all members or had come to rescue prior to 2011 
(Busch 2012, Panagiotarea 2013: 156). A rescue packaged should be designed to resurrect the 
aggregate demand within the Greek economy. Funds from earlier packages have largely been made 
available to pay off debt from German banks. It is, however, necessary to temporarily neglect 
Greece current debt in favor of reestablishing its economy. 
The European Union still subscribes to the Maastricht Treaty, which long ago became outdated. 
New actions have to take form otherwise the entire EU project risks of falling to pieces (Busch 
2012, Panagiotarea 2013: 149). In accordance with the Maastricht Treaty, Greece reached an 
agreement with the ‘Troika’ concerning an economic adjustment program. One of the pivotal aims 
behind the agreement was to improve Greece’s growth potential by implementing structural reforms 
in the public sector. Structural reforms would have led to increased competitiveness from Greece, 
with investors restoring faith in the Greek economy and its bonds (Higgins & Klitgaard 2011, Criste 
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2013). It was then expected that Greece would register negative growth in the succeeding years 
after the agreement was implemented, 2010 and 2011, but that the following years would result in 
positive growth (Busch 2012). This did not go as expected, and Greece were still recording negative 
growth in 2013 and had only a slight positive growth in 2014 of 0.8 % of GDP (Eurostat 2015a). 
Furthermore, it was expected that the unemployment then would decrease in the followings years as 
direct consequences of the agreement with ‘Troika’ (Busch 2012). In reality, the unemployment 
climbed to 25.7 % in March 2015 (Eurostat 2015b). This then goes to show the austerity measures 
perhaps are not as effective as previously thought Rogers & Vasilopoulou 2012). Analysis have 
showed that for a solution to be found on the issues there is a need for looking beyond the 
Maastricht Treaty. The proposed solution methods contains a new growth strategy, Eurobonds, 
discarding the market states method, changing the financial markets and supranational European 
economic government (Busch 2012). The fashion which the European Union tried to help Greece 
has just worsened the crisis. Greece went from a debt ratio of 22 % points between 2007 and 2009 
and rose to 70 % after the crisis outbreak. Because of this, if nothing changes, Greece and the Euro 
is stuck in a vicious circle, the harsh austerity policy implemented towards Greece led to a 
recession, which then causes increased budget deficits and then hampers Greece’s ability to pay off 
its debt (Busch 2012, Panagiotarea 2013: 156). 
 
Solutions to Stabilize the Greek Economy and Resurrect the Euro Area 
As this project has accounted for throughout the analysis, it is the bad structure of the European 
Union, which caused the severe damages during the crisis. With a stronger structure, Europe would 
presumably not have been under such severe pressure by the crisis. Europe placed their faith in the 
hands of the Maastricht Treaty, which as discussed previously, is obsolete and do not view state 
interventions as a solution tool. By the implementation of these policies the crisis only enlarged. 
Europe has to open up and look for new methods. The previous strategy did not present the results 
expected, and there is no evidence that a persistence with these methods would pay up shortly. In 
this paragraph, the proposed solution by other scholars will be examined. 
 
The Marshall Plan of the European Union 
One of the biggest issues with the previously implemented rescue plans has been the austerity that it 
is implemented with removing the growth potential from the already poorly placed countries. For 
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this to change, Busch (2012) believes there is a need radical economic paradigm change, preferably 
changing the austerity to a growth perspective. The solution to this is with inspiration from the 
history books it is a Marshall plan for the European Union. The Greek version of the Marshall Plan 
would need to focus on the stimulation of the Greek economy’s aggregate demand. This is 
something that earlier aid packages given to Greece has not done. They have instead focused on 
paying off Greek debt to German banks, which does not resurrect the Greek economy. A financial 
aid package in the vein of the Marshall Plan would, however, have to forget the current Greek debt 
temporarily, so that aggregate demand could foster lower unemployment and, thereby, increase the 
economic growth of Greece. A steady economic growth would increase the amount of foreign 
investments in Greece as a result of perceived lesser uncertainty in the volatile Greek economy, and 
corresponding lesser yield of the Greek bond (Sklias, Roukanas & Milas 2014).  
For this to happen three steps needs to be followed: first, a supranational fiscal infrastructure should 
replace the current one; secondly, countries with account surpluses should strive for increasing the 
domestic demand; third, the member states with large sovereign debt should relax on the austerity 
policies and promote investment to gain growth. The Marshall Plan would encourage spending in 
Europe leading to growth spread through Europe. 
 
The Introduction of a Common Fiscal Policy in the European Union 
For a currency area to be considered optimal, it has to fulfill certain criteria’s such as; labor 
mobility and fiscal transfers among others, which the European Union at the current time does not 
fulfill. This means that the current structure of the European Union does not allow for it to be 
considered an optimal currency area (Mundell 1961, McKinnon 2000, Horváth & Komárek 2002, 
Vukoslavcevic 2012).  
The economic foundation of the current European Union is built upon the division of monetary and 
fiscal policies. As discussed previously the monetary policies are conducted in the European Union 
whereas the fiscal policies are conducted on a national level, resulting in a big diversity of the fiscal 
policies. This division makes it difficult for the European Union to be a homogeny union: 
 "[...] monetary policy and fiscal policy must go hand in hand, and for the presence of 
an optimal combination of the two, it is necessary that they have the same domain. The single 
Treasury, in collaboration or in competition with the Central Bank, should have absolute control 
over public spending and taxation decisions"  (Kenen 1969: 45).  
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The implementation a common fiscal policy would alleviate the trade imbalances across the euro 
area by redistributing income from wealthier central European countries to poorer peripheral 
countries. A redistribution of wealth would, of course, necessitate a supranational taxation enforced 
by the European Commission, which then could be redistributed to accommodate the imbalances. 
Such a system would bear a resemblance to the federal system of USA (Sklias, Roukanas & Milas 
2014). By altering the Maastricht Treaty Criteria to not only prevent excessive budget deficits but 
also prevent excessive surpluses, then it would, furthermore, prevent the trade imbalances by 
constantly circulating income from member country to member country, and therefore, not create 
bubbles of savings within one national economy (Vukoslavcevic 2012, Sklias, Roukanas & Milas 
2014). This should be in every member's interest as 70 % of the trade in the European Union is with 
other members, meaning there is a strong interdependency and every member would benefit from a 
union without member states in debt crisis (Busch 2012). 
A common fiscal euro area policy would, also, prevent the several of the occurrences discussed in 
chapter 5. The current lack of judicial power enables national incumbents to pursue morally hazard 
political strategies that only benefit the economy in the short term. If the European Commission 
could legislate the fiscal policy, then the political business cycles would not occur, as incumbents 
would be unable to fiddle with the necessary parameters (Vukoslavcevic 2012). A European 
Commission- led fiscal policy would also prevent that national policies would be determined by the 
incumbent’s need to be reelected, preventing unnecessary budget deficits. The European 
Commission would act as the external legislator that is not a concern with winning elections 
contrary to that of national politicians. An external legislator would be able to legislate lower 
wages, welfare and a more effective taxation system to increase public revenue, something that 
Greek politicians has been incapable of. 
 
Regulations of the Financial Markets  
We have previously mentioned that the debt crisis in the euro area occurred based on the 
international crisis. As a result of this, there have to be made some changes in the financial market 
structures to ensure crisis as this do not occur again.  
One of the solutions to this could be a reduction the financial institutes so the premise of “too big to 
fail” no longer withholds. This would be implemented by dividing the financial institutes into 
smaller houses instead of one big one. This should, in theory, ensure, that one small part of the 
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structure can fail without the entire institution should be in danger of bankruptcy (Stern & Feldman 
2004: 146, Busch 2012). The banking sector should be changed. Banks would be divided into 
commercial and investment banks. The commercial banks should provide with loans to consumers 
and investors. The investments banks would, under strict control by supervisory authorities, be 
active actors with regards to capital and foreign exchange. Trades should be more transparent, 
where trading platforms should have stricter rules and be under supervision. The equity of the banks 
should be under reinforcement with changes to the loan/deposit ratios as well, which would lower 
the risks for the banks. Tax havens should be removed from the globe, where taxes should be paid 
in the country the value creation occurs. This would allow for a much larger tax income for states 
such as Greece and help finance their over deficit. Rating agendas should be severe supervision and 
prosecution, when false evaluations occur, will be an available tool to have them under control 
(Busch 2012, Sklias, Roukanas & Maris 2014). 
 
Economic Government in the Euro Area 
For the ideas mentioned above to be implemented and be orchestrated correctly a supranational 
economic government have to be implemented. This government would oversee the economics of 
the euro area and would be grounded in cooperation between the member states. The need for a 
democratically elected government is underlined by the non-democratic constitution of the 
European Union, which should be structured by a transnational solution with equal weighting of the 
votes (Crombez 2003). The new structure would then be that the European Commission would be 
administrating the economic policy guidelines including the benchmark figures the different 
member states has to uphold. The guidelines have to be accepted by the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council with an absolute majority in the European Parliament approving these guidelines 
(Busch 2012). This economic government would be the main actor on the financial scene in Europe 
allowing the members states and the European Union to have a more coherent fiscal policy. The 
European economic government proposed in 2011 is only expected to deal with debt brakes and 
sanctions. The one proposed here is expected to benefit every member in the euro area with a 
potential for growth and implementing a unified fiscal policy minimizing the risk of another crisis 
inside of the euro area (Sklias, Roukanas & Maris 2014, Mody 2015). 
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Conclusion 
It is evident from this project’s analysis of the structure of the euro area that it did have an impact 
on the Greek sovereign debt crisis. It did so in several distinct ways; 
Primarily, the accession of the euro area allowed Greece to borrow carelessly money to fuel its 
ever-increasing debt. This was made possible by the negative real interest rates provided by 
European Central Bank. This meant that Greece throughout the intermediate period between its 
accession and the crisis accumulated large amounts debt, and due to the inability of the European 
Commission to demand a Greek contractionary fiscal policy, it spiraled out of control, creating a 
relatively uncompetitive Greek economy with unnecessary high wages that did not correspond to 
the low productivity of the Greek laborers. 
The availability of foreign loans encouraged Greek incumbent politicians to pursue expansionary 
fiscal policies when an election year was near. Foreign loans meant that public spending in Greece 
rose significantly in election years without decreasing in the same amount the following years, 
essentially creating an upward spiral of public spending through political business cycles. 
It is evident that the euro area needs to implement a sort of fiscal union to counteract the incentives 
of national incumbents, as it is the only way to make an optimal union. Such a union would include 
mechanisms that prevent the current trade imbalances between the core and periphery of the euro 
area through fiscal transfers and saving limits. It is, furthermore, important to acknowledge the 
differences of the individual countries in the euro area, as common policy-making for all countries 
is doomed to favor significantly certain members over others. 
A common fiscal union would, however, require a supranational economic government, and 
thereby, a loss national sovereignty by the member countries. A supranational economic 
government would then be better suited to make the appropriate policies for the euro area, as well as 
dealing with crises, such as the current crisis in Greece. It is evident that the national incentives of 
the European powerhouses has influenced the financial aid packages provide to Greece. This has 
resulted in half-hearted attempts at a mixture of austerity and stimulus of aggregate demand. It is, 
however, necessary for the restabilization of the Greek economy, that it gains temporary debt-
forgiveness to focus on increasing its aggregate demand. 
If the euro area wants to be the stalwart of European peace and stability that it wishes to be, then it 
needs to reform itself, as it is currently enabling moral hazardous behavior by its members, which is 
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bringing the peripheral countries on collision course with the core countries, and destabilizing the 
entire union. 
 
Perspectivation 
The conclusion raises several fundamental questions about the integration within the European 
Union. The Euro first and foremost, finds itself at a crossroad where there are only two possible 
paths; a more deepening integration to knit the euro area countries closer together, or disbandment 
of the euro area. As argued for throughout the previous chapters, the euro area is in a volatile state, 
where it is hindered by structural constraints, and crises such as the current one in Greece is not 
unlikely to happen again. 
The obvious solution is, of course, for the individual countries to return to their former respective 
currencies. A return to the pre-Euro currencies would inherently solve the structural problems of the 
euro area. However, this solution is limited by sheer lack of political willingness to lessen the 
integration of the European project. A disbandment of the euro area would be considered a colossal 
loss of prestige for its front runners Germany and France. There has simply been put too much 
political effort into the Euro just to abandon it at the current stage (Lynn 2011: 223). As German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel eloquently put it: “If [the] Euro fails, so will the idea of [the] European 
Union” (Der Spiegel 2010). 
Another problem is the initial period of reminting national currencies and revaluating compared to 
the Euro. This period would be defined by uncertainty by investors, and would, therefore, hurt the 
national economies immensely (Lynn 2011: 224, Bootle 2012). Thus, it is an unlikely scenario to 
occur due to the negative national consequences such a decision would have due to the short-term 
economic impact. 
At the other end of the solution-spectrum is a deepening of the economic integration. As argued for 
extensively in chapter 6, this would involve the inclusion of a fiscal union with tighter regulation of 
national economies. While this would be the ideal option, it is, however, not without its pitfalls. The 
most obvious is the necessary loss of sovereignty by the member countries needed to implement a 
fiscal union. The need to surrender sovereignty severely impairs the possibility of an additional 
deepening of the economic integration, as evident from the increasing popularity of right winged 
nationalist parties within the EU, such as Golden Dawn in Greece and Front National in France, 
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whose political program includes lesser involvement with EU (Tokár 2001, Keohane 2002, 
Langenbacher & Schellenberg 2011). 
Given the prevalence of incumbents’ national political agendas over that of European agendas, as 
discussed in chapter 5, along with the national populist movement throughout Europe, it seems 
increasingly hard to deepen the economic integration of the euro area. Neither the national 
politicians nor the voters have any short-term incentive to loss sovereign to a supranational 
institution. A supranational institution that, furthermore, lately has fared increasingly worse. 
This outlook upon the future of European economic integration is at best rather bleak. Caught at a 
crossroad, Europe seems unable to take any of the appropriate paths due to its countries national 
structural inadequacies. It does, however, raise another acute problem of the paradox of a combined 
deepening and widening integration (Chamon & Van der Loo 2014). 
What this project has argued is that pursuing both a deepening and widening economic integration 
can have disastrous consequences, as a deep integration e.g. common currency suffers severely 
from heterogeneity within its member countries. This raises the question of whether tighter 
economic ties within EU should be pursued at the expense of a wider integration or even pursue 
fragmentation (Chamon & Van der Loo 2014). To pursue such an integration would ensure that the 
participating countries would be as much alike as possible, which would make for more effective 
policy-making (Guérot 2004). 
A widening of the European economic integration does, however, seem to be preferred integration. 
The preference of widening integration largely boils down to it being easier to implement, as it does 
not involve the loss of sovereignty from the current members. However, with the inclusion of 
additional Eastern European countries into the euro area, it seems inevitable that the vast 
differences between the core and the periphery shine through eventually. 
It seems that to achieve both a deepening and widening integration, EU needs to have federal union 
aspirations. Otherwise, deepening and widening integration should be pursued separately, as they 
do not complement one another. The issue at hand then becomes how to proceed with the further 
economic integration of Europe and the euro area, and at its essence, how to decrease the national 
sovereignty of its member countries (Laursen 2006: 127). 
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Appendix A - Public Debt 
Public debt data retrieved from IMF 2014 
  Austria Belgium Cyprus Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy 
1990 56,2% 129,2%  13,8% 35,2%  73,3% 94,5% 94,3% 
1991 56,4% 130,7%  21,9% 36,0% 39,5% 74,8% 95,6% 97,6% 
1992 56,3% 133,5%  39,4% 39,7% 42,0% 80,1% 92,4% 104,7% 
1993 60,9% 137,8%  54,2% 46,0% 45,8% 100,5% 95,2% 115,0% 
1994 64,0% 135,9%  56,5% 49,2% 48,0% 98,5% 89,8% 121,2% 
1995 68,2% 130,2% 50,7% 55,5% 55,4% 55,6% 97,0% 80,1% 120,9% 
1996 68,1% 127,2% 53,5% 55,7% 58,0% 58,5% 99,4% 71,3% 120,3% 
1997 64,1% 122,5% 58,3% 52,9% 59,4% 59,8% 96,6% 62,8% 117,4% 
1998 64,4% 117,2% 63,9% 47,6% 59,5% 60,5% 94,5% 54,1% 114,3% 
1999 66,8% 113,6% 64,6% 45,7% 58,9% 61,3% 94,0% 47,7% 113,1% 
2000 66,2% 107,8% 60,8% 43,8% 57,4% 60,2% 103,4% 37,0% 108,6% 
2001 66,8% 106,5% 62,3% 42,5% 56,9% 59,1% 103,7% 34,5% 108,3% 
2002 66,2% 103,4% 66,5% 41,5% 59,1% 60,8% 101,7% 31,8% 105,4% 
2003 65,3% 98,4% 69,6% 44,5% 63,3% 64,4% 97,4% 31,0% 104,1% 
2004 64,7% 94,0% 71,6% 44,4% 65,2% 66,2% 98,9% 29,4% 103,7% 
2005 64,2% 92,0% 70,8% 41,7% 66,8% 68,6% 101,2% 27,2% 105,7% 
2006 62,3% 87,9% 65,4% 39,6% 64,1% 68,0% 107,5% 24,6% 106,3% 
2007 60,2% 84,0% 58,8% 35,2% 64,2% 65,2% 107,2% 24,9% 103,3% 
2008 63,8% 89,2% 48,9% 33,9% 68,2% 66,8% 112,9% 44,2% 106,1% 
2009 69,2% 95,7% 58,5% 43,5% 79,2% 74,5% 129,7% 64,4% 116,4% 
2010 72,3% 95,7% 61,3% 48,7% 82,4% 82,5% 148,3% 91,2% 119,3% 
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  Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Average 
of euro 
area 
1990   57,2% 42,5% 49,8% 
1991   60,7% 43,1% 51,9% 
1992   55,2% 45,4% 50,3% 
1993   54,4% 56,1% 55,2% 
1994   57,4% 58,6% 58,0% 
1995 7,4% 76,1% 59,1% 63,3% 42,8% 
1996 7,4% 74,1% 58,2% 67,5% 44,4% 
1997 7,4% 68,2% 54,3% 66,2% 42,5% 
1998 7,1% 65,7% 50,3% 64,2% 42,1% 
1999 6,4% 61,1% 49,4% 62,4% 39,6% 
2000 6,2% 53,8% 48,4% 59,4% 39,2% 
2001 6,3% 50,7% 51,1% 55,6% 39,3% 
2002 6,3% 50,5% 53,7% 52,6% 38,3% 
2003 6,2% 52,0% 55,7% 48,8% 39,1% 
2004 6,4% 52,4% 57,5% 46,3% 39,6% 
2005 6,1% 51,8% 62,5% 43,2% 38,0% 
2006 6,7% 47,4% 63,7% 39,7% 35,8% 
2007 6,7% 45,3% 68,4% 36,3% 34,7% 
2008 14,4% 58,5% 71,7% 40,2% 39,1% 
2009 15,5% 60,8% 83,7% 54,0% 48,0% 
2010 19,5% 63,4% 94,0% 61,7% 53,0% 
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Appendix B - Real Interest Rates 
* Compiled from interest rates minus inflation 
Interest rates data retrieved from OECD 
Inflation data retrieved from IMF 2014 
  Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland 
1992 6,0% 7,1% 7,9% 4,5% -15,9% 11,2% 
1993 3,8% 5,7% 6,4% 2,8% -14,4% 7,7% 
1994 2,4% 3,3% 4,2% 2,6% -10,9% 3,6% 
1995 3,0% 3,5% 4,8% 2,8% 7,4% 3,7% 
1996 1,6% 1,4% 1,8% 2,1% 5,6% 3,3% 
1997 2,3% 1,9% 2,2% 1,8% 7,3% 4,8% 
1998 2,8% 2,6% 2,9% 2,9% 9,2% 3,3% 
1999 2,4% 1,8% 2,4% 2,3% 7,7% 0,5% 
2000 2,4% 1,7% 2,6% 3,0% 4,7% -0,9% 
2001 2,0% 1,8% 2,5% 2,4% 0,9% 0,3% 
2002 1,6% 1,8% 1,4% 2,0% -0,3% -1,4% 
2003 1,0% 0,8% 0,2% 1,3% -1,2% -1,7% 
2004 0,2% 0,3% -0,2% 0,3% -0,8% -0,2% 
2005 0,1% -0,4% 0,3% 0,3% -1,4% 0,0% 
2006 1,4% 0,7% 1,2% 1,3% -0,1% 0,4% 
2007 2,1% 2,5% 2,7% 2,0% 1,4% 1,4% 
2008 1,4% 0,1% 1,5% 1,9% 0,5% 1,5% 
2009 0,8% 1,2% 1,1% 1,0% 0,0% 2,9% 
2010 -0,9% -1,5% -0,9% -0,3% -3,9% 2,4% 
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  Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Average 
of euro 
area 
1992 9,0% -3,2% 6,2% 7,8% 6,2% 6,4% 
1993 5,7% -3,6% 4,3% 7,3% 7,1% 4,6% 
1994 4,3% -2,2% 2,4% 6,1% 3,3% 3,0% 
1995 5,1% -1,9% 2,7% 5,8% 4,7% 4,5% 
1996 4,8% -1,2% 1,6% 4,4% 3,9% 3,2% 
1997 5,0% -1,4% 1,5% 3,8% 3,5% 3,5% 
1998 3,0% -1,0% 1,7% 2,1% 2,5% 3,4% 
1999 1,3% 1,9% 0,9% 0,8% 0,7% 2,1% 
2000 1,8% 0,6% 2,0% 1,6% 0,9% 1,9% 
2001 1,9% 1,9% -0,9% -0,2% 1,4% 1,3% 
2002 0,7% 1,3% -0,5% -0,4% -0,3% 0,5% 
2003 -0,5% -0,2% 0,1% -0,9% -0,8% -0,2% 
2004 -0,2% -1,1% 0,7% -0,4% -0,9% -0,2% 
2005 -0,0% -1,6% 0,7% 0,1% -1,2% -0,3% 
2006 0,9% 0,1% 1,4% 0,0% -0,5% 0,6% 
2007 2,2% 1,6% 2,7% 1,9% 1,4% 2,0% 
2008 1,1% 0,5% 2,4% 2,0% 0,5% 1,2% 
2009 0,5% 1,2% 0,3% 2,1% 1,5% 1,2% 
2010 -0,8% -2,0% -0,1% -0,6% -1,2% -0,9% 
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Appendix C - Unemployment 
Unemployment data retrieved from IMF 2014 
2001       2002       2003       
11,2% 10,5% 10,2% 11,2% 11,4% 10,0% 9,8% 10,2% 10,4% 9,4% 9,3% 10,0% 
            
2004       2005       2006       
11,4% 10,3% 10,2% 10,5% 10,5% 9,8% 9,8% 9,9% 9,8% 8,9% 8,4% 8,9% 
            
2007       2008       2009       
9,2% 8,2% 8,0% 8,2% 8,4% 7,3% 7,3% 8,0% 9,5% 9,0% 9,4% 10,5% 
            
2010            
11,9%            
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Appendix D - Foreign Debt-to-GDP Ratio 
Foreign debt data retrieved from World Bank 2015 
GDP data retrieved IMF 
  Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland 
2002   27,94%  20,00%   
    33,16%  23,70%   
    35,36%  24,47%   
    38,91% 26,24% 27,10%  22,41% 
2003   34,58% 23,28% 24,20%  18,60% 
  52,85%  38,22% 26,39% 26,28% 51,89% 21,42% 
  51,10%  38,11% 28,00% 26,52% 53,28% 20,38% 
  53,45% 50,23% 40,75% 31,51% 27,81% 65,12% 20,37% 
2004 47,98% 45,94% 34,29% 28,52% 25,31% 60,50% 16,47% 
  49,97% 46,53% 35,24% 29,43% 24,50% 62,09% 18,62% 
  52,69% 48,00% 37,30% 31,35% 26,53% 65,80% 17,71% 
  54,12% 48,79% 42,94% 36,74% 30,13% 73,73% 18,73% 
2005 44,51% 41,50% 34,20% 26,43% 24,37% 52,80% 15,96% 
  45,83% 44,01% 33,10% 27,43% 24,93% 57,95% 15,14% 
  47,73% 44,58% 34,01% 28,30% 24,13% 59,47% 17,12% 
  50,32% 45,98% 36,01% 30,15% 26,14% 63,02% 16,28% 
2006 41,81% 39,18% 32,22% 25,06% 23,24% 48,48% 14,53% 
  43,04% 41,56% 31,19% 26,00% 23,78% 53,20% 13,78% 
  44,83% 42,09% 32,05% 26,83% 23,02% 54,60% 15,58% 
  47,27% 43,42% 33,93% 28,58% 24,93% 57,86% 14,82% 
2007 36,21% 34,08% 27,21% 21,88% 20,29% 41,52% 12,46% 
  37,28% 36,15% 26,34% 22,70% 20,76% 45,56% 11,82% 
  38,83% 36,61% 27,06% 23,42% 20,09% 46,76% 13,36% 
  40,94% 37,76% 28,65% 24,95% 21,76% 49,55% 12,71% 
2008 32,68% 30,77% 24,54% 19,88% 18,55% 37,00% 12,21% 
  33,64% 32,64% 23,76% 20,63% 18,98% 40,61% 11,58% 
  35,04% 33,06% 24,41% 21,29% 18,37% 41,67% 13,09% 
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  36,95% 34,10% 25,84% 22,68% 19,89% 44,16% 12,46% 
2009 35,35% 33,06% 27,94% 21,54% 20,42% 39,46% 14,33% 
  36,39% 35,06% 27,05% 22,35% 20,89% 43,30% 13,59% 
  37,90% 35,52% 27,79% 23,06% 20,22% 44,44% 15,37% 
  39,96% 36,63% 29,42% 24,57% 21,90% 47,09% 14,62% 
2010 35,94% 33,23% 28,28% 22,02% 20,40% 43,08% 15,44% 
 
  Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Average 
of euro 
area 
2002    29,89%   25,94% 
     35,79%   30,88% 
     40,08%   33,30% 
  44,77% 0,06%  43,49% 29,41% 29,05% 
2003 39,06%   39,31% 22,41% 28,78% 
  43,63%  29,04% 41,74% 23,91% 35,54% 
  45,20%  29,51% 43,91% 23,33% 35,93% 
  45,53% 0,05% 31,17% 47,37% 24,93% 36,53% 
2004 39,06% 0,04% 31,62% 42,36% 22,13% 32,85% 
  39,67% 0,04% 31,81% 42,69% 21,71% 33,53% 
  40,23% 0,04% 34,38% 45,00% 22,83% 35,15% 
  42,83%  36,78% 51,04% 26,33% 42,01% 
2005 38,61% 0,04% 26,28% 39,99% 19,49% 30,35% 
  37,93% 0,04% 30,19% 40,92% 20,44% 31,49% 
  38,53% 0,04% 30,38% 41,23% 20,04% 32,13% 
  39,07% 0,04% 32,82% 43,47% 21,08% 33,70% 
2006 36,85% 0,04% 24,78% 38,05% 17,84% 28,51% 
  36,21% 0,03% 28,47% 38,94% 18,71% 29,57% 
  36,78% 0,03% 28,64% 39,23% 18,35% 30,17% 
  37,30% 0,03% 30,95% 41,36% 19,30% 31,64% 
2007 32,43% 0,03% 21,45% 33,12% 15,30% 24,66% 
  31,86% 0,03% 24,64% 33,89% 16,04% 25,59% 
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  32,37% 0,03% 24,79% 34,14% 15,73% 26,10% 
  32,82% 0,03% 26,79% 35,99% 16,54% 27,37% 
2008 29,80% 0,03% 19,21% 30,37% 13,79% 22,40% 
  29,28% 0,03% 22,07% 31,07% 14,46% 23,23% 
  29,74% 0,03% 22,21% 31,31% 14,18% 23,70% 
  30,16% 0,03% 23,99% 33,00% 14,92% 24,85% 
2009 32,64% 0,03% 21,05% 32,74% 15,14% 24,48% 
  32,07% 0,03% 24,19% 33,50% 15,88% 25,36% 
  32,57% 0,03% 24,33% 33,76% 15,57% 25,88% 
  33,03% 0,03% 26,29% 35,59% 16,38% 27,13% 
2010 33,55% 0,03% 21,59% 33,51% 15,91% 25,25% 
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Appendix E – Current Account Balance 
Current account balance-to-GDP ratio data retrieved from IMF 2014 
  Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland 
1990 0,7% 1,8% -5,0% -0,8% 2,9% -3,8% -1,3% 
1991 0,0% 2,3% -5,4% -0,5% -1,3% -1,6% 0,0% 
1992 -0,4% 2,9% -4,6% 0,3% -1,1% -2,0% 0,8% 
1993 -0,8% 5,2% -1,3% 0,7% -0,9% -0,7% 4,2% 
1994 -1,6% 5,3% 1,1% 0,6% -1,4% -0,1% 3,4% 
1995 -2,9% 5,4% 4,1% 0,5% -1,2% -2,4% 3,3% 
1996 -2,9% 5,0% 4,0% 1,2% -0,6% -3,7% 3,6% 
1997 -2,5% 5,5% 5,6% 2,7% -0,5% -5,2% 3,5% 
1998 -1,6% 5,2% 5,6% 2,6% -0,7% -4,3% 0,8% 
1999 -1,7% 7,9% 5,3% 3,1% -1,3% -5,5% 0,2% 
2000 -0,7% 4,0% 7,8% 1,5% -1,7% -7,8% -0,4% 
2001 -0,8% 3,4% 8,4% 1,8% -0,0% -7,2% -0,6% 
2002 2,7% 4,5% 8,5% 1,2% 2,0% -6,5% -1,0% 
2003 1,7% 3,4% 4,8% 0,7% 1,9% -6,5% -0,0% 
2004 2,2% 3,2% 6,2% 0,5% 4,7% -5,8% -0,6% 
2005 2,2% 2,0% 3,4% -0,5% 5,1% -7,6% -3,5% 
2006 2,8% 1,9% 4,2% -0,6% 6,3% -11,4% -3,6% 
2007 3,5% 1,9% 4,3% -1,0% 7,5% -14,6% -5,3% 
2008 4,9% -1,3% 2,6% -1,7% 6,2% -14,9% -5,6% 
2009 2,7% -0,6% 1,8% -1,3% 5,9% -11,2% -2,3% 
2010 3,4% 1,9% 1,5% -1,3% 6,4% -10,1% 1,1% 
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  Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Average 
of euro 
area 
1990 -1,9%  2,7% -0,2% -3,5% -0,8% 
1991 -2,5%  2,5% -0,8% -3,6% -1,0% 
1992 -2,7%  2,0% -0,2% -3,5% -0,8% 
1993 1,2%  4,0% 0,2% -1,1% 1,0% 
1994 1,2%  5,1% -2,2% -1,2% 0,9% 
1995 2,2% 12,0% 6,3% -0,1% -0,3% 2,2% 
1996 3,1% 11,5% 5,2% -4,0% -0,2% 1,9% 
1997 2,8% 9,9% 6,6% -5,8% -0,1% 1,9% 
1998 1,8% 8,5% 3,3% -7,2% -1,2% 1,1% 
1999 1,0% 10,7% 3,9% -8,7% -2,9% 1,0% 
2000 -0,2% 13,2% 2,0% -10,3% -4,0% 0,3% 
2001 0,3% 8,8% 2,6% -10,3% -3,9% 0,2% 
2002 -0,4% 10,5% 2,6% -8,2% -3,3% 1,0% 
2003 -0,8% 8,1% 5,5% -6,4% -3,5% 0,7% 
2004 -0,3% 11,9% 7,6% -8,3% -5,3% 1,3% 
2005 -0,9% 11,5% 7,4% -10,3% -7,4% 0,1% 
2006 -1,5% 10,4% 9,3% -10,7% -9,0% -0,2% 
2007 -1,3% 10,1% 6,7% -10,1% -10,0% -0,7% 
2008 -2,9% 5,4% 4,3% -12,6% -9,6% -2,1% 
2009 -2,0% 7,3% 5,2% -10,9% -4,8% -0,9% 
2010 -3,5% 7,7% 7,4% -10,6% -4,5% -0,0% 
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Appendix F – Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the structural issues of the euro area and the impact the structure has the 
member countries. The theoretical framework of the project is based on the Keynesian approach. 
This allows for an analysis of the structure and how the structure of the euro area affect a country 
with severe sovereign debt issues, like Greece, financially and hinders their ability to hamper a 
potential crisis. We focus our research on the euro area and Greece. The construction of the project 
is a division of three parts; one focusing on the ideas and thoughts prior to the implementation of 
the euro and the following issues, another discussing the indebtedness of Greece and the European 
Commission’s inability to coerce the Greek politics, and lastly one revolving around the constraints 
of the Maastricht Treaty and how it affected the Greek government’s ability to recover from a crisis 
and list potential solutions to the issue. 
The euro area has since the outbreak of the crisis been inherently unstable with different reforms 
proposed and implemented, but none has seem to achieve the expected results by the euro area. To 
showcase the weaknesses with the euro area, we looked at Greece as a case study and have tried to 
generalize from the information and knowledge we gathered from this. 
We analyze the structure of the euro area and conclude that the structure of the euro area had an 
impact on the Greek sovereign crisis. We argue the fact that the euro area allowed Greece to borrow 
money carelessly, resulting in a vicious circle, because of a lack a contractionary fiscal policy 
demand by the European Commission. 
Furthermore, we argue for the implementation of a fiscal policy in the euro area, to prevent a crisis 
from occurring again. The initiative of fiscal transfers and saving limits would prevent trade 
imbalances. Moreover, the notion of a common policy for all countries is destined to favor certain 
members instead of serving the greater good. 
 
